Is there a redaction mode?

No, and the filter above is why there does not need to be one. A redaction
mode would have to hash or truncate the session key where the entry is built,
in radius/diagnostics/summarize.py, and that costs more than it buys:

  • A hashed or truncated session key is pseudonymisation, not
    anonymisation
    . It still correlates one subscriber's records to each other
    across the whole timeline — which is precisely the property the timeline
    exists for.
  • It would break the operator's main workflow: searching the timeline for the
    subscriber they are on the phone with. A hash is not something you can type
    in from a trouble ticket.
  • The salt becomes a second secret to manage, and a per-box salt makes entries
    from two boxes uncorrelatable in the SIEM that collects both.

Every one of those costs is paid to protect the identifier on the box, where
it is behind operator authentication and is the reason the feature exists. The
risk was the identifier leaving the box, and that is a different place. The
shipper filter addresses it there, at full fidelity locally and nothing at all
off-box by default.

If you need the on-box value redacted as well — a threat model where the
operator themselves must not see the identifier — that is a real requirement
and a different one. Tell us, and it goes in summarize with the trade-offs
above accepted deliberately rather than by default.